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This report is written from the perspective of an informed observer at the  
Twenty-First Annual Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information Technology.  
Unless attributed to a particular person, none of the comments or ideas contained  
in this report should be taken as embodying the views or carrying the endorsement  
of any specific participant at the conference.
Foreword
Many of us grew up learning about bell curves as the shape of normal 
distribution of most problems we faced.  Certainly, in a high middle 
class society such as the United States, the bell curve described the 
wealth and income distribution of American society: starting low with 
the few rich, rising up to reflect a large middle class, and tapering off 
with a sizeable but still diminishing poverty class.
As the technology boom of the 1990s increased productivity, many 
assumed that the rising water level of the economy was raising all those 
middle class boats. But a different phenomenon has also occurred.  The 
wealthy have gained substantially over the past two decades while the 
middle class has remained stagnant in real income, and the poor are 
simply poorer.  This has led some to wonder if America is turning into 
a power-curve society: one where there are a relative few at the top and 
a gradually declining curve with a long tail of relatively poorer people. 
Indeed, a recent report by the Pew Research Center prompted an 
ominous headline: “Middle class share of America’s income shrink-
ing.”1 The report seems to bolster already compelling arguments that 
mid-level jobs, the kind that helped create economic stability in the 
1950s and 1960s, are becoming rarer.  For the first time since the end 
of World War II, the middle class is apparently doing worse, not better, 
than previous generations.  If these statistics are an accurate measure of 
how people are doing, then this is an alarming trend. 
What is the role of technology in these developments?  How will 
future generations fare in a world defined less by broad distributions 
of wealth and more defined by power-curves?  Will a small number of 
“winners,” accumulate the larger share of wealth through an increas-
ingly automated and globalized economy? If this is our trajectory, how 
can we brace ourselves for it? 
To answer these and similar questions the Aspen Institute 
Communications and Society Program assembled a knowledgeable 
group of thinkers, leaders, innovators and entrepreneurs seasoned in 
the digital economy for a three-day dialogue in Aspen, Colorado in 
v
1. “The Lost Decade of the Middle Class,” Pew Research Center, August 22, 2012. Available at  
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/22/the-lost-decade-of-the-middle-class/.
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August of 2012. The event focused on the broader economic and social 
implications of an economy being redefined by new networks, behav-
iors and rules. A significant portion of the discussion also explored per-
sonal data as a possible untapped source of economic empowerment. 
Rapporteur David Bollier details the results of that dialogue in the 
following report. He begins with a sweeping look at the relationship 
between innovation and productivity, summarizing key insights offered 
by Robert Atkinson of the Information Technology and Innovation 
Foundation. Next, he examines the “New Economy of Personal 
Information,” offering cutting-edge insights and recommendations 
from leaders in the field such as Michael Fertik of Reputation.com, 
Shane Green of Personal.com, and John Clippinger of MIT’s ID3. 
Bollier then delves into the workings of the “Power-Curve Society,” 
presenting arguments from Kim Taipale and Bill Coleman, whose 
earlier email exchanges sparked the topic of the Roundtable itself. 
The report then focuses on the critical question of the future of jobs, 
highlighting presentations by MIT’s Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew 
McAfee, whose recent book Race Against the Machine: How the 
Digital Revolution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and 
Irreversibly Transforming Employment and the Economy has brought 
significant attention to the subject. 
Lastly, the report covers the social, policy and leadership implica-
tions of the “Power-Curve Society,” collecting insights and summariz-
ing forward-thinking recommendations for action, particularly in the 
realm of education, from the likes of Reed Hundt, Joi Ito, Leila Janah, 
James Manyika, and many others.
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Equity in the Emerging Networked Economy
 By David Bollier
Introduction
It is now nearly twenty years since the World Wide Web exploded, 
helping to insinuate the Internet and countless digital technologies into 
all aspects of the economy and everyday life. Yet even as businesses 
struggle to come to terms with this revolution, a new set of structural 
innovations is washing over businesses, organizations and government, 
forcing near-constant adaptation and change.  It is no exaggeration to 
say that the explosion of innovative technologies and their dense inter-
connections is inventing a new kind of economy.  
Although the new technologies are clearly driving economic growth 
and higher productivity, the distribution of these benefits is skewed in 
worrisome ways.  Wealth and income distribution no longer resemble 
a familiar “bell curve” in which the bulk of the wealth accrue to a large 
middle class.  Instead, the networked economy seems to be producing 
a “power-curve” distribution, sometimes known as a “winner-take-all” 
economy.  A relative few players tend to excel and reap disproportion-
ate benefits while the great mass of the population scrambles for lower-
paid, lower-skilled jobs, if they can be found at all.  Economic and social 
insecurity is widespread.
This report provides a sketch of the emerging “power-curve econo-
my” and its far-reaching economic and social implications.  We start 
by giving an overview of contemporary trends in technological inno-
vation and their economic implications. We then continue with an 
assessment of a major component of this new economy, Big Data, and 
the coming personal data revolution fomenting beneath it that seeks to 
put individuals, and not companies or governments, at the forefront. 
Companies in the power-curve economy rely heavily on big databases 
of personal information to improve their marketing, product design, 
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and corporate strategies. The unanswered question is whether the mul-
tiplying reservoirs of personal data will be used to benefit individuals 
as consumers and citizens, or whether large Internet companies will 
control and monetize Big Data for their private gain.  
Why are winner-take-all dynamics so powerful?  We next examine 
why networks often produce power-curve distributions, and how these 
dynamics appear to be eroding the economic security of the middle 
class.  Is this an inexorable structural trend, and if so, how might its 
impacts be mitigated?  A special concern is whether information and 
communications technologies are actually eliminating more jobs than 
they are creating—and in what countries and occupations.
Finally, this report looks at the broader social implications of the 
emerging economy.  How is the power-curve economy opening up 
opportunities or shutting them down?  Is it polarizing income and 
wealth distributions?  How is it changing the nature of work and tra-
ditional organizations and altering family and personal life?  Although 
there are obvious benefits from the wealth creation that stem from 
innovation and growth, many observers fear a wave of social and politi-
cal disruption if a society’s basic commitments to fairness, individual 
opportunity and democratic values cannot be honored.  An important 
question, therefore, is what role government should play in balancing 
these sometimes-conflicting priorities.  How might educational policies, 
research and development, and immigration policies need to be altered? 
To address this complex mix of issues, the Aspen Institute 
Communications and Society program convened a diverse group 
of twenty-eight experts from the worlds of information technology, 
venture capital, economics, government policymaking, philanthropy, 
academia and management consulting, for three days of discussion, 
from August 1 - 3, 2012, in Aspen, Colorado.  Charles M. Firestone, 
Executive Director of the Aspen Institute Communications and Society 
Program, moderated.  This report is an interpretive synthesis of the 
highlights of those talks.  
The Innovation Economy
Although technological innovation has long been linked to economic 
prosperity, the emergence of the Internet and digital technologies over 
the past thirty years has transformed the very processes of innovation 
and boosted economic growth in dramatic new ways.  This impact is 
elusive, however, because the actual effects of information and com-
munications technology (ICT) investment are not always immediately 
felt, properly measured or well-understood.  
In an opening presentation, Robert Atkinson, Founder and President 
of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, argued 
that when it comes to what is more important to economic growth—
“more tools, a better ability to use them, or new tools,” the answer is 
fairly clear.   In building a house, for example, a pneumatic nail gun is 
more likely to increase productivity than multiple hammers or a train-
ing class on how to use a hammer better.
Conventional economics says that progress comes from new infu-
sions of capital, whether financial, physical or human.  But those are not 
necessarily the things that drive innovation, said Atkinson:  “What drives 
innovation are new tools and then the use of those new tools in new 
ways.”  Over the past twenty years, he said, the new tools provided by ICT 
have affected all industries and all aspects of what we do.  He estimated 
that at least 50 percent of the acceleration of productivity over these years 
has been due to ICT and that the world economy has grown $1.5 trillion 
larger just because of the “dot-com” component of the Internet.  
Measuring the actual impact of technological innovations and plot-
ting their acceleration or deceleration is the challenge, however.  In the 
1950s, economist Robert Solow used an “eliminationist” methodology to 
argue that whatever was left over after counting capital, labor and other 
known variables was “the residual,” a growth factor that he attributed to 
innovation.  Since then, economists have developed a number of proxy 
metrics for innovation, such as research and development expenditures. 
But even with such metrics, Atkinson believes that economists both 
underestimate and overestimate the scale and scope of innovation. 
Some sorts of innovation may add social value without necessarily 
increasing market output as measured by GDP.  An example is the 
large amount of time and talent that people voluntarily contribute to 
Wikipedia.  Yet other sorts of innovation, such as doubling of comput-
ing power in personal computers, are over-counted, said Atkinson.  This 
can be seen in the practice of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis of 
counting increases in processing power or hard-drive capacity as mean-
ing that computer companies had produced more computers.  
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Calculating the magnitude of innovation is also difficult because 
many innovations now require less capital than they did previously. 
According to traditional economics, the shrinkage of capital investment 
should lead to a decline in the growth rate of productivity.  But in fact, 
productivity and utility gains from innovation may be greater, as seen 
in the substitution of digitized music for physical CDs.  If computing 
moves to quantum processes, Atkinson wondered how economists 
would measure that gain in productivity and innovation.
There are several ways to regard the arc of innovation over time.  A 
conventional approach is to see innovation as a linear, exponential phe-
nomenon—a path of improvement that is accelerating in predictable, 
straight lines.  The idea of linear, exponential growth in innovation 
leads to gross errors, said Atkinson, citing the predictions of futurist 
Herman Kahn in the 1970s for the year 2000.  By extending contem-
poraneous trends, Kahn under-estimated the impact of Moore’s law 
(the doubling of computing power every 18 months) while over-esti-
mating the societal impact of ICT.  Others scholars such as economist 
Joseph Schumpeter and economic historian Carlotta Perez, author of 
Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital, see innovation as going 
in cycles, not steady trajectories.  
For his part, Atkinson, writing with his co-author Stephen J. Ezell, in 
their new book Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage, 
believes that technological innovation follows the path of an “S-curve,” 
with a gradual increase accelerating to a rapid, steep increase, before 
it levels out at a higher level.  One implication of this pattern, he said, 
is that “you maximize the ability to improve technology as it becomes 
more diffused.”  This helps explain why it can take several decades to 
unlock the full productive potential of an innovation.  
Atkinson believes that there is a serious “innovation failure” in the 
U.S. economy because of insufficient investment and inadequate gov-
ernment policies.  But he adds that the types of innovation that are 
possible today are more daunting:  “Why isn’t there more innovation 
when we’re spending more on it as a planet than we’ve ever spent on 
it before?  I think it’s because innovation keeps getting harder.  It was 
pretty easy to invent stuff in your garage back in 1895.  But the technical 
and scientific challenges today are huge.”
Some conference participants took issue with this critique, however, 
noting that the costs of innovation have plummeted, making it far eas-
ier and cheaper for more people to launch their own startup businesses 
and pursue their unconventional ideas.  Joi Ito, Director of the MIT 
Media Lab, noted that his father, an academic physician, could only 
acquire animals for laboratory experiments by traveling to the single 
producer of most research mice for North America.  Now, said Ito, it’s 
possible to order all sorts of experimental materials quickly and cheaply 
from the Internet.  Or consider gene fabrication, said Ito:  “When you 
try to print a gene, it gets sent to a factory in China where 700 people 
manually do things.  There is usually about one error per 100 base pairs. 
Now we can print genes in a ‘bio-fab’ and there is only one error per 
10,000 base pairs.  What has limited gene fabrication in the past has 
been an inability to print genes.  At the MIT Media Lab, we will soon 
have half of the world’s capacity.  Moore’s Law will hit bio-fabs.”
John Clippinger, Co-Founder and Executive Director of ID3, a non-
profit that deals with digital identity and authentication, agreed that 
innovation costs are plummeting.  “Biotech and genomics are starting 
to make Moore’s Law look flat.  The cost of genomic sequencing has 
gone from $1 million to $1,000 in three years.  It doesn’t even make 
sense to get a PhD in certain fields because the skill set is obsolete by 
the time the person finishes.”  
Atkinson conceded such cost-efficiencies, but wonders if “the real 
question is that problems are getting more complicated more quickly 
than the solutions that might enable them.”  He noted that in the life 
sciences, for example, problems invariably are revealed to be far more 
complicated than originally thought.  Certain tools may be radically less 
expensive or useful, but the problems to be solved may remain “wicked 
problems.”
Bright Simons, Director of Development Research for the IMANI 
Center for Policy and Education, suggested that we may need to parse 
the different stages of innovation:  “The cost of innovation generally 
hasn’t dropped,” he argued.  “What has become less expensive is the 
replication and diffusion of innovation.”
This prompted a call to clarify what is meant by “innovation,” which 
is, after all, a fairly elastic concept.  A standard framing of “innovation” 
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sees it as “invention plus implementation.”  But even this definition 
may be inadequate if “implementation” is seen only as a technical 
capacity to implement.  A lot of barriers to innovation can be found in 
the lack of financing, organizational support systems, regulation and 
public policies.
The problem is that there is a serious mismatch 
between the pace of innovation unleashed by 
Moore’s Law and our institutional and social 
capacity to adapt. 
The engineering innovations for high-speed rail in California are 
entirely feasible, noted John Kunzweiler, Chief Executive Officer of 
M Squared Consulting, Inc., but various governmental institutions 
cannot let it happen.  Professor Erik Brynjolfsson, Director of the 
Center for Digital Business at the MIT Sloan School of Management, 
noted that his research found that “90 percent of innovation costs 
involve organizational capital,” such as people’s ability to learn to use 
an innovation and institutions being able to manage them.  The prob-
lem, it appears, is that there is a serious mismatch between the pace of 
innovation unleashed by Moore’s Law and our institutional and social 
capacity to adapt.
This raises the question of whether old institutions can adapt—or 
whether innovation will therefore arise through other channels entirely. 
“Existing institutions are often run by followers of conventional wis-
dom,” said Zoë Baird Budinger, President of the Markle Foundation. 
“Large companies may not be able to innovate, but they can acquire 
innovation.  They can’t be capable of thinking of the next generation 
of innovation.” Rather than trying to tinker with existing regulatory 
structures or corporate practices, Baird Budinger urged greater focus 
on new sorts of policy and regulatory architectures that can support 
innovation.  The best way to identify new sources of innovation, as 
Arizona State University President Michael Crow has advised, is to “go 
to the edge and ignore the center.”
The Accelerating Pace of Innovation 
Paradoxically, one of the most potent barriers to innovation is the 
accelerating pace of innovation itself.  Institutions and social practice 
cannot keep up with the constant waves of new technologies.  “I find 
that I have to completely reinvent the skills and practices that I use 
about every eighteen months to two years,” said John Seely Brown, 
Independent Co-Chairman of the Deloitte Center for the Edge.  The 
S-curves that may have characterized technology innovation and dif-
fusion over the past three centuries may be coming to an end, he said. 
“We are moving into an era of constant instability,” Brown asserted, 
“and the half-life of a skill today is about five years.”
Part of the problem, he continued, is that our economy is based 
on “push-based models” in which we try to build systems for scalable 
efficiencies, which in turn demands predictability.  “But in the world 
we are moving into,” said Seely Brown, “that makes less and less sense. 
The real challenge is how to achieve radical institutional innovations 
that prepare us to live in periods of constant two- or three-year cycles 
of change.  We have to be able to pick up new ideas all the time.”  Of 
course, adapting to the faster pace of innovation implies profound 
changes in institutional structures, social practices, education and cul-
ture.  (Brown explains more about the “push” and “pull” economy in 
his 2010 book, The Power of Pull.)
Julius Genachowski, Chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission, agreed that the pace of innovation is a major story in 
our economy today.  “Two companies that are less than four years old, 
LivingSocial and Groupon, have created about 15,000 jobs between 
them, about half of them in the United States,” he said.  These are not 
just engineering jobs in Silicon Valley, but jobs for salespeople around 
the country, selling and distributing products of value to small busi-
nesses.
The rise of the “App Economy” is a vivid example of the ripple 
effects of innovation.  The App Economy consists of a core company 
that creates and maintains a platform (such as Blackberry, Facebook 
or the iPhone), which in turn spawns an ecosystem of big and small 
companies that produce apps and/or mobile devices for that platform. 
“Almost a million apps have been created for the iPhone, iPad and 
Android alone,” writes Michael Mandel, Chief Economic Strategist 
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of the Progressive Policy Institute, “greatly augmenting the usefulness 
of mobile devices.”  Mandel calculates that “the App Economy is now 
responsible for roughly 466,000 jobs in the United States, up from zero 
in 2007 when the iPhone was introduced.”1 
The App Economy has become a robust global phenomenon, and 
the U.S. has regained global leadership in mobile.  “In Japan and South 
Korea,” said Genachowski, “they’re using American operating systems 
and American apps.”  He tied this success back to the open, innovative 
infrastructure and competition in the U.S. for mobile devices:  “The 
U.S. is becoming the first country in the world to roll out 4G LTE [a 
standard for wireless communication of high-speed data] at scale.  It’s 
going to dramatically change the nature of our mobile infrastructure in 
the U.S. and put us ahead of Europe, China and India by a substantial 
distance.” 
The App Economy illustrates the rapid, fluid speed of innovation in 
a networked environment—a trend that is likely to accelerate as new 
sets of global players prepare to enter markets for technological devel-
opment.  Shantanu Sinha, President and Chief Operating Officer of 
Khan Academy, an educational nonprofit that provides “a free world-
class education for anyone anywhere,” pointed to the impact that MIT’s 
Open Courseware and edX initiatives have had. “Bringing seven billion 
people into the innovation conversation is something that has never 
happened before in society.  That’s a major shift in where innovation is 
going to come from.” 
This reality can be seen in new crowdsourcing models such as Kaggle, 
an online data prediction competition that invites people to submit the 
most predictive algorithms.  On Kaggle, the winning submissions are 
not closely correlated to the world’s great universities or to the U.S., but 
are globally distributed in an absolute sense, said Andy McAfee of the 
Center for Digital Business at the MIT Sloan School of Management. 
The project demonstrates that problem-solving is a global, Long Tail 
phenomenon.  All you need is a lot of good data, smart algorithms and 
an EC2 account (“Elastic Compute Cloud”), a supercomputer capacity 
that Amazon and others offer as a paid, utility service.  
As a technical matter, then, many of the legacy barriers to innovation 
are falling.  Enormous computing capacity is more readily available 
through vendors like Amazon; small businesses are becoming more 
comfortable using such systems to improve their marketing and lower 
their costs; and, vast new pools of personal data are becoming extreme-
ly useful in sharpening business strategies and marketing.  
… “permissionless innovation” is crucial.   
– Robert Pepper 
Another great boost to innovation in some business sectors is the 
ability to forge ahead without advance permission or regulation, said 
Joi Ito, Director of the MIT Media Lab.  “In bio-fabs, for example, 
it’s not the cost of innovation that is high, it’s the cost of regulation,” 
he said.  “How can America be competitive in that space with all the 
regulatory requirements around it?”  The reason that Internet took off 
in the U.S. but not so much in Europe and Japan, said Ito, is because 
Americans did not try to regulate it.  
This notion of “permissionless innovation” is crucial, agreed Robert 
Pepper, Vice President, Global Technology Policy, at Cisco Systems, Inc. 
“In Europe and China, the law holds that unless something is explicitly 
permitted, it is prohibited.  But in the U.S., where common law rather 
than Continental law prevails, it’s the opposite—if something is not pro-
hibited, it is permitted.  We let people go forward and then figure out the 
consequences later.  That was a huge driver for all Internet innovation, 
and that’s something that I don’t think we should lose.”
The New Economy of Personal Information
One of the most significant developments affecting innovation is 
the rise of large databases of personal information.  As the number of 
electronic devices proliferate and interconnect, many more opportuni-
ties are being created to collect “data crumbs” of personal information 
resulting from web visits, credit card transactions, cell-phone transmis-
sions and online purchases, among many other activities.  This flood of 
data, if properly organized and analyzed, contains potentially powerful 
market intelligence for companies, which is precisely why “Big Data” is 
becoming a far more central element of the emerging economy.  (For a 
fuller treatment of this subject, see the 2010 Aspen Institute report, The 
Promise and Peril of Big Data.2)  
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Michael Fertik, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Reputation.
com, an online reputation management company, gave a brief overview 
of the ways in which digitized personal information is transforming 
commerce and jeopardizing people’s privacy.  On the one hand, data 
is often regarded as the “new oil” of the Internet because of its value to 
companies.  On the other hand, people are becoming increasingly con-
cerned about the erosion of their privacy as more third parties, from 
banks to government to retailers, learn some very intimate, everyday 
details about people’s social identities, consumer tastes, travel move-
ments, social cohorts, political views and much else. 
Large companies that collect personal data, such as Google and 
Facebook, have pointed out that information disclosures that occur 
through Internet searches or Facebook usage are entirely voluntary—
and the users of such services get back something of value for free. 
What’s the harm in such consensual arrangements? they argue. 
Fertik pointed out, however, that such arguments are either incom-
plete or false:  “Most of the people who think they are giving their 
data to a certain website do not know how it or a company will use 
it.  Moreover, the vast majority of data being collected about us when 
we interact with a machine are collected without our knowledge in the 
first place.  Even the people who run these companies, large and small, 
often don’t really know how the data is ultimately used.  That’s not 
because they are operating with any malicious intent, but because they 
literally don’t know.”  Fertik noted the irony that “the companies that 
often benefit from the transparency of the Internet are often the most 
intransigent in their unwillingness to tell you what data they have about 
you.  They do not want to disclose it.”  That is because information 
brokers and large Internet companies make a lot of money controlling 
vast amounts of personal data.
A number of fairly new companies are now trying to disrupt this 
standard model by empowering individuals to control their own data. 
Some of the new companies targeting individuals include Fertik’s own 
company, Reputation.com as well as Personal.com and ID3.  These ven-
tures each take different approaches toward protecting personal infor-
mation but are all focused, at their core, on enabling people to better 
control and leverage data about themselves and their lives.  Reputation.
com helps individuals and businesses identify and correct inaccurate, 
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misleading or outdated material about them on the Web.  Personal pro-
vides a safe and secure data vault for storing, importing and reusing a 
person’s important data, notes and files, and a private network for shar-
ing that information with trusted people, organizations and apps.  ID3 
is building an ambitious set of new Internet protocols and an adaptable, 
open-source software platform that will let users control the types of 
information that they wish to disclose, and to whom.
These latest ventures represent a new approach to protecting privacy 
and empowering people with their data in the wake of failures by an 
earlier generation of companies and software innovations by the hack-
tivist community.  Some companies in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
positioned themselves as “infomediaries,” as Fertik put it.  “They tried 
to sit between you and advertisers, curating information for you and 
taking a cut of revenue from companies that wanted to reach attentive, 
receptive audiences,” he said.  This business model did not work at 
that time for a number of reasons, including technological and other 
limitations. It was the dawn of e-commerce and people were just begin-
ning to understand that Internet use could result in any compromise 
to privacy, let alone the tracking or plundering of their personal data 
by others for financial gain. As it turned out, these companies learned 
quickly that profits could be achieved far more rapidly by selling access 
to the very personal information they sought to represent, without any 
involvement by the individuals. In effect, at that time, the foxes really 
were guarding the henhouse. This is in stark contrast to the rise of per-
sonal data companies in the 2000s, such as Reputation.com, Personal.
com, and others. 
Ten years ago Microsoft attempted to introduce a set of software 
protocols for privacy known as Passport, which aimed to let people 
curate and control any transfers of their personal data.  But this inno-
vation also failed, in part because Internet users lacked appropriate 
knowledge and awareness about the need for privacy protections at this 
early stage of Web 2.0.  In addition, as Fertik pointed out, many viewed 
data intermediaries like Microsoft as inherently less trustworthy than 
a peer-to-peer system that is globally distributed across the Internet. 
For their part, hacktivists have tried to address privacy concerns by 
building software to aggregate enough people to interact in the cloud, 
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with the hope that a large collective of users could then have fruitful 
negotiations with commercial interests.  But these experiments—such 
as Diaspora, a “privacy-friendly” alternative to Facebook—have not 
succeeded either.
Circumstances are changing, however.  “Large companies are com-
ing to see the enormous value propositions for growth in developing 
new ways of managing people’s data,” said Fertik.  Interestingly, the 
industries that are most eager to find socially acceptable ways to mon-
etize Big Data are currently the most constrained and regulated:  banks, 
credit card companies, insurers and Internet service providers.  But 
these companies tend to have few practical ideas for exploiting the data, 
perhaps because they have been constrained, legally or otherwise, from 
actually doing so.
The industries that are most resistant to any change in the status 
quo, said Fertik, are Internet-based media incumbents such as Google 
and Facebook, which argue that new requirements to protect privacy 
will destroy innovation.  Shane Green of Personal said that when he 
talks to people at large Internet companies that gather lots of personal 
data, he is “amazed” at their resistance to disclosing how they capture 
data, what they do with it and how much money they make from it. 
“They sound just like Ma Bell from way back,” said Fertik.  “They 
have absolutely no interest in talking about privacy.  Why won’t [these 
companies] open up and talk about how they capture data and what 
they do with it?  Because they’re controlling things in a way that benefit 
them and not everyone else.” Green noted that, in the digital world, 
people are experiencing a variant of “Stockholm syndrome” in which 
victims come to identify with their captors. In the current model of 
the Internet, companies and governments are capturing and exploit-
ing people’s data every day with very little benefit of the data accruing 
to the individual. Yet, individuals have not objected to these practices, 
mostly because individuals have not been properly educated about the 
value of their data and they have not been given the tools to appropri-
ately leverage it, Green added.  
Nonetheless, a great deal of experimentation in software and busi-
ness models is now underway.  The diverse approaches include busi-
nesses that offer “data lockers” or “data vaults” to users; private data 
exchanges or “trust frameworks” that let users selectively share their 
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data; vertical “silos” of data sharing in healthcare systems; client-
oriented software systems to protect privacy; and private cloud-based 
technologies; among others.   
But even with this diversity of approaches, Fertik believes there are 
essentially only four strategies for monetizing data in today’s environ-
ment:  to give people coupons or discounts for disclosing data; to give 
people special privileges such as frequent flyer miles; to give people cash 
payments; or to simply protect people’s private information from any 
disclosures.  “I list these strategies in that order,” said Fertik, “because 
that is the order in which I believe the future will unfold.” Green added 
that he also sees a subscription model taking shape for the storage and 
management of one’s data.
 The ultimate achievement in privacy protection in the network 
environment, said Fertik, would consist of consumers being able to 
“purchase a product through a double-blind API [Application Protocol 
Interface], which can confirm that you have a valid Web address and 
that you are a real person and you are eligible to buy the product.  But 
the vendor would never be able to find out your identity; the shipping 
label would come from some other vendor’s printer.  So the vendor 
would get the commercial transaction and social trust, and you would 
get the ongoing relationship.  That is a new and different way of think-
ing about the Internet, but it is quite feasible.”
John Clippinger, Co-Founder and Executive Director of ID3, thinks 
there may be another, better approach to achieve user control over 
personal data—through a “pool economy.” He explained, “You can 
aggregate lots of different users into a pool in a principled and protec-
tive way, and then help create new markets by offering this aggregated 
consumer demand to sellers, through reverse-auctions and other mech-
anisms.  This could create enormous efficiencies.”  
Perhaps the most cost-effective way to pursue this vision, said 
Clippinger, is to “bake the protocols for authentication, security and 
identity into the infrastructure of the Internet.  Instead of allowing 
banks and other information intermediaries to establish themselves 
as artificial ‘chokepoints’ controlling data flows—introducing huge 
inefficiencies and costs in the process—the system could commoditize 
these functions by making it a standard set of Internet protocols.”  This 
is an increasingly credible vision because the sophistication of online 
authentication, security and identity is getting very advanced, he said.
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The virtue of “baking the protocols into the infrastructure” is its 
ability to enable much more fluid types of social exchange (both market 
and nonmarket) while also protecting people’s personal information, 
said Clippinger.  Such a change would also disintermediate many of the 
information brokers that now act as gatekeepers over access to credit 
or that certify qualifications or membership for various purposes.  If 
this certifying of identity and credentials could be democratized, and 
performed in a more dynamic, real-time fashion, it could enable the 
creation of entirely new sorts of digital institutions.  Self-organized 
groups of users or consumers could aggregate their own resources and 
declare their own standards of eligibility and credentials.  Highly effi-
cient, secure and reliable software systems could manage digital identi-
ties and access to privileges.
A question was raised if this scenario would yield only modest ben-
efits, as in discounts through Groupon-like aggregations of consumers. 
Another question is whether the data would be confined to “stove-
pipes” that would restrict access to only a narrow group of users.  The 
answer in both instances is no, Clippinger stated:  it is possible to design 
a system that simultaneously enables data-driven markets, significant 
consumer benefits and user-centric control of personal information. 
Green added that one of Personal.com’s primary goals is to break down 
the multitude of stovepipes that exist already and to make data truly 
portable and reusable for the individual.  
Michael Fertik of Reputation.com believes that data-driven insight is 
the key to new business opportunities in the new economic ecosystem. 
The first phase of the Internet, which is still going on, is content, he said, 
as exemplified by Yahoo!, Facebook and Twitter.  The second phase has 
been the story of search, he said, which has now expanded into such 
things as facial recognition search.  But the third phrase will be about 
insight drawn from aggregating huge stores of data.  A simple example, 
he said, is counseling professionals about their future career paths 
based on the data income of large numbers of people in a given field.
John Clippinger of ID3 cited a project that his venture is involved 
with for DARPA (U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), 
which seeks to explore the pro-social uses of data-mining from mobile 
phones.  “If you take behavioral data and combine it with personal data, 
financial data and health data, and then you do data mining of the com-
bined results, it is going to tell you a lot about yourself—and you will 
get a much more accurate signal of who you are and what you want.   By 
controlling this signal for whatever purposes—medical care, personal 
affiliations, consumer purchases—you can provide a very powerful sig-
nal to companies about what you want.  This would constitute a new 
kind of identity—and trustworthy signal of consumer demand—in the 
emerging digital economy.”  In this scenario, users who control their 
data—but selectively disclose it to vendor x and institution y—would 
reap direct and substantial benefits from their personal data.  
But would people’s personal data truly be secure?  Charles Firestone 
of the Aspen Institute noted that there is “an arms race” now underway 
to disaggregate anonymized data in order to identify specific individuals. 
The key question for the future is the specific 
terms under which data will be shared.
“This is where the design principles of the technology are really 
important,” replied Clippinger.  He explained that the personal data 
store can be made more secure by scattering a person’s data across 
many web servers rather than centralizing it in one place.  In addition, it 
is possible to allow third parties to make queries of the data and receive 
useful replies without disclosing any specific personal information. 
(For example, does this person have sufficient income to qualify for this 
loan?  The system could truthfully answer yes or no without disclosing 
specific personal data.)  
Clippinger noted that security/authentication technology can also 
be designed to raise the technical and economic costs of “breaking” the 
data locker, which would greatly deter security breaches.  For example, 
the system could constantly refresh codes so that there is a very strong 
access-certification process; it could create digital “noise” so that it is 
harder for snoopers to trace IP addresses; and it could virtualize net-
work interactions so that any calculations “disappear” after a transac-
tion, leaving no links to be traced or correlated with anything.
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Imagining an Open, Trusted Data-Driven System
Given the enormous value to be had from sharing data, the key ques-
tion for the future is the specific terms under which data will be shared. 
There are obvious benefits from amassing large quantities of personal 
data and then sifting through them to make insightful, actionable infer-
ences.  But how can users be induced to share their data in the first 
place if they believe that the institutions controlling that data cannot 
be trusted?  If data is to be shared in commerce, what should market 
transactions look like and how might they be regulated to prevent anti-
social abuses?
Many entrepreneurs want to overturn the current business models 
that let large companies like Facebook and Google monetize people’s 
personal data in exchange for free services (search, social networking). 
The new models envision giving users exclusive control over their 
personal information, and not just for monetization.  Shane Green of 
Personal does not envision data markets in which people might sell 
their children’s health information to the highest bidder, for example. 
Rather, he envisions a “very responsible, controlled marketplace in 
which the individual has the ultimate ability to decide what to reveal 
about himself.”  It would be entirely feasible to protect one’s anonymity 
and yet also selectively disclose personal information in order to learn 
about and buy desired products or services.  
 “The two most important pieces of data from the perspective of 
advertisers,” said Shane Green, “is your interest in buying something 
and the fact that you actually did buy it later.”  Marketers dream of 
linking those two data-points.  But if data-vendors, with individuals’ 
consent, could identify specific people as prospective buyers, sellers 
could treat them as “a certified [potential] buyer” of a class of products 
or services.  The seller would get a more likely buyer than they could 
elicit through advertising; the individual buyer could get the product 
they want and perhaps a discounted price; and the data-vendor would 
make pennies from each data-driven transaction.  
This would be a far more efficient system for linking buyer and 
seller than existing advertising, and it would also dramatically reduce 
expensive transaction costs that are otherwise folded into prices.  “This 
is a totally ‘inverse type’ of approach, so it can be really hard for people 
oriented to the current model to get their minds around it,” said Green.
Green cited other business models based on “structuring data” for 
people in useful ways.  For example, filling out forms can be a time-
consuming and tedious “friction” that impedes commercial transac-
tions.  If data could be delivered onto forms automatically, it would 
help consumers and boost commerce.  
Green said that he admires the direct, value-added propositions of 
Evernote and Dropbox, which both allow users to collaborate and share 
their notes or files stored in the services. He sees them as trailblazers 
for products focusing on data-driven cloud storage solutions that have 
achieved scale. The companies have also introduced straight-forward 
subscription models that do not hide their monetization or the eco-
nomic value exchange from the user.  As for the social contract between 
users and companies with respect to data, he sees the bargain in these 
terms:  “I’ll give you, the vendor, use of my data, but you can’t keep it 
and do whatever you want with it.  You can use it only for the specified 
purpose.  If you come up with a new purpose, you’re going to ask me 
permission—but if I tell you to stop using it, you will stop using it.” 
This scenario just does not exist today, said Green.
Clippinger added to Green’s scenario by suggesting that the future 
of privacy control may also reside with “member networks,” not just 
with individuals dealing with sellers.  Under plans being pursued by 
ID3, individuals would indeed control their personal data, but they 
could opt to belong to “branded trust networks” that would act on their 
behalf in certain circumstances, said Clippinger.  “So it would not just 
be you, an atomized individual, negotiated with a company, but you, 
as a member of a collective (whether commercial or nonprofit) that is 
representing all of its members,” he said.
Many conference participants made the point that the key to the 
success of any scheme for privacy protection will be transparency, trust 
and accountability—and that these will be best fulfilled by empowering 
individuals.  “I think it’s an inane notion that companies, regulators or 
other people are going to be better able to decide than individuals how 
their privacy should be protected,” said Shane Green.  “Obviously, they 
will play a major role, he said, but as people discover the value of their 
privacy as well as their data—and the fact that companies are hoard-
ing all the benefits that flow from their data for themselves—they will 
demand and make the new rules for how their data should be treated.”
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The ultimate goal, said Michael Fertik, is to find new ways to enable 
“knowing, voluntary exchanges” of personal data that can be trusted: 
“This will allow greater benefit to the end-user, greater benefit for the 
retailer and lower prices down the line.”  But achieving this goal will be 
difficult in the new data-driven universe, he said, because it is unclear if 
usage of large, highly fluid datasets can be properly monitored and their 
owners held accountable.  This is a fundamental problem that will have 
to be overcome in a world of large, interconnected databases. 
“It’s an inane notion that companies, regulators 
or other people are going to be better able to 
decide than individuals how privacy should be 
protected.” – Shane Green  
Reed Hundt, former FCC Chairman and now Principal of REH 
Advisors, believes that datasets ought to be treated as “public goods” 
and overseen by laws and social norms dictating their appropriate use. 
He cited familiar categories of public concern such as health, education, 
energy, national security and the democratic process.  The real question 
is how we might go about creating systems for treating data in these 
categories as public goods, he said.
There are some efforts underway to “liberate government data” 
and treat it as public goods, noted Zoë Baird Budinger of the Markle 
Foundation.  She cited Todd Park, the Chief Technology Officer at 
the White House, who is trying to “liberate” government datasets on 
health, energy and other subjects by making them openly available to 
all.  The idea is to emulate the government’s release of weather infor-
mation, which has become a public good that various business models 
and research projects use to build innovative new services.  
One initiative in this vein is the U.S. Veterans Administration’s “Blue 
Button” (www.va.gov/bluebutton), which allows individuals to access 
and download their personal health records in a very simple text file or 
PDF document.  Such downloads can help patients more easily inform 
emergency room doctors or other healthcare providers about their 
medical conditions. Another is the U.S. Department of Education’s 
My Data Button for federal education data, which will allow 20 million 
students to download individual information about themselves, such as 
their own federal financial aid records (see http://www.ed.gov/edblogs/
technology/mydata/). 
Datasets ought to be treated as “public goods” and 
overseen by laws and social norms dictating their 
appropriate use.  – Reed Hundt  
The need for better privacy protections is quite urgent, said Joi Ito of 
MIT Media Lab, because privacy “is a fundamentally important thing 
in any open society.  Diminishing the privacy of individuals makes it 
easier for those in power to squash dissent,” he said.  “Without dissent, 
you don’t have democracy.  So I think the cost to democracy is some-
thing that everyone needs to think about.”
The Power-Curve Phenomenon and its Social Implications
A profound change is occurring in both the global and national econ-
omies as more commerce migrates to networked platforms.  This change 
is the rise of a power-curve distribution of wealth and income as net-
work platforms reduce the friction that previously impeded economic 
productivity in the old economy.  A power-curve embodies the principle 
of what is known as a power law distribution, in which a small number 
of people reap a disproportionate share of the benefits of a market (or 
other network-based activity) while the bulk of participants receive very 
modest gains.  This is sometimes referred to as a winner-take-all or 
80/20 rule, in which 20 percent of the participants reap 80 percent of 
the gains, and 80 percent of the people receive 20 percent of the gains. 
Power-curve distributions are entirely predictable in many physical and 
biological contexts, but they also appear to describe structural inequali-
ties produced on human networks, particularly on the Internet.
The conference devoted a session to this issue as a result of several 
email exchanges months earlier between Kim Taipale, Founder and 
Executive Director of the Stilwell Center for Advanced Studies, and 
Bill Coleman, Partner in the venture capital firm Alsop Louie Partners. 
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The lively exchange was provoked by a March 6, 2011, column by New 
York Times columnist Paul Krugman about the loss of American jobs to 
automation and globalization; one response that Krugman urged was a 
restoration of bargaining power for organized labor.3 
In reading Krugman’s analysis, Taipale saw evidence of a power-law 
distribution in the network-based markets that are transforming more 
and more segments of the U.S. and global economies.  Taipale asked: 
How will power-law distributions affect jobs creation, incomes, and 
wealth in the future?  Will social inequality and instability result if noth-
ing is done about the growing disparities of rewards from the emerging 
network-based economy?  
Existing organizational structures are being 
replaced by platforms or networks. – Kim Taipale 
Below, we excerpt portions of the email dialogue between Taipale 
and Coleman before recounting how conference participants reacted 
to the arguments set forth.
Taipale’s thesis can be succinctly stated:  “The era of bell curve dis-
tributions that supported a bulging social middle class is over and we 
are headed for the power-law distribution of economic opportunities. 
Education per se is not going to make up the difference.”  
The kinds of work performed by “information creators, exploiters 
and decision-makers”—entertainers, artists, CEOs, entrepreneurs, 
technology architects, etc.—will continue to have a future, said Taipale. 
But the jobs of information managers who make up the bulk of the 
upper middle class—lawyers, accountants, programmers—are seri-
ously endangered as new forms of software-based automation and 
outsourcing accelerate.  There will continue to be many low-paid, rela-
tively unskilled working-class jobs as service providers, Taipale argue, 
but “the spoils from the economy will be increasingly distributed on the 
power-law curve.”   
Existing organizational structures are being replaced by platforms or 
networks, said Taipale.  This is significant because it is taking so much 
friction out of the system, and it is happening faster and faster.  In the 
Industrial Age, when information was managed in analog form—i.e., 
unstructured and on paper—businesses needed lots of workers in the 
“middle” to manage information inefficiency, he said.  That’s why 
General Motors had ten layers of management between the shop floor 
and the executive suite.  It was a vast, inefficient, paper-based infor-
mation sorting and distribution organization that was responsible for 
creating many “well-paying” middle class jobs.  A great many of those 
jobs have been lost over the past thirty years, replaced first by comput-
ers and later by networks that allowed decisionmakers to have greater 
direct oversight and control over production.
Today, skill sets are becoming obsolete within five 
years…disruptive changes are occurring ten times 
or more in a single generation. 
This process is now accelerating as new types of “connecting 
platforms” and associated apps—iPhone, EC2, YouTube, the cloud 
infrastructure itself, among others—are deployed.  These technolo-
gies are lowering interaction costs for collaboration, coordination and 
market-making.  The shift is making markets more efficient, competi-
tive and productive—and in the process, destroying the jobs that have 
historically sustained the middle class, said Taipale:  “The only reason 
we have the middle class is because it was over-compensated for what 
it contributed to the system, thanks to the relative inefficiencies of tech-
nologies at the time.”  
Those inefficiencies could not be automated and outsourced previ-
ously—but now they can, said Taipale.  And that is introducing more 
aggressive power-law distributions as participation in network plat-
forms (and thus the value of those platforms) grow.  The technology-
enabled efficiencies may create greater wealth and broader distributions 
of it, said Taipale, but not enough to maintain existing middle class 
standards of living in “high-cost silos” such as the U.S.
A key issue here is not just the displacement of middle class jobs but 
the accelerated rate at which they are being displaced and thus the inabil-
ity of society and the economy to adapt.  The Industrial Revolution 
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went through a similar transformation, with old jobs destroyed and 
new ones created.  But that transformation occurred over a period of 
generations, Taipale pointed out.  Today, skill sets are becoming obso-
lete within five years, which means that systemic, disruptive changes 
are occurring ten times or more in a single generation.  Our society is 
not prepared for this kind of hyper-accelerated pace of change, he said. 
We simply do not have the policy architectures or social organization 
to handle it, said Taipale, and no one in the private sector, public sector 
or emerging social systems are even close to grappling with what these 
trends imply.
“The more freedom there is in a system, the more 
unequal the outcomes become.” – Kim Taipale 
The paradoxical result of network effects, Taipale noted, is that 
“freedom results in inequality.  That is, the more freedom there is in a 
system, the more unequal the outcomes become.”   This is because of 
the power-law distribution that tends to prevail on open platforms, as 
wealth flows to the “super-nodes,” a phenomenon sometimes called 
“preferential attachment.”
In the 20th century economy, wealth and income tended to be allo-
cated broadly to the middle class in the pattern of a classic bell curve. 
But in the new power-curve economy that appears to be emerging, dis-
tributions are scale-free and therefore “there is no characteristic node 
and the average has no useful meaning.”  There is no “representative” 
member of the whole because distributions are so skewed.  
For example, even though 90 percent of Americans self-identify as 
middle class, the mean income in the U.S. is now $63,000, said Taipale—
but the median household income (in which there are an equal number 
of people earning more and earning less than that amount) was $50,054 
in 2011.4 This disparity suggests the mismatch between “average” and 
actual income distribution; the disproportionate number of lower-
wage earners reduces the mean income by a one-third, making “the 
average” far less meaningful.  This polarization of incomes could grow 
worse in the power-curve economy, Taipale contends.
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Although some observers tout the App Economy as a redemptive force 
for economic growth and social benefit, Taipale scoffs:  “Even if 400,000 
‘new jobs’ are created by hiring app developers, those are not stable, mid-
dle class jobs of the sort that previously existed.  Companies that would 
have been hiring Web developers last year are now hiring app developers 
for a ‘B round’ or ‘C round’ of [venture financing].”  The point is that 
the overall distribution of productivity gains in the networked economy 
is increasingly subject to power-law distribution and control.  Only a 
relatively small number at the top reap the lion’s share of gains. 
If power-curve distributions become the norm in 
the new economy, it could result in greater social 
polarization and even social disruption.  
– Kim Taipale
In very approximate terms, said Taipale, the bottom 80 percent of 
app developers are making, say, three percent of the revenues.  The 
mean revenue that a developer reaps from an app is $3,000 a year, but 
the median is $600 a year.  That means that some people are making a 
huge amount of money, and the rest are not.  But the cost of making an 
app is between $15,000 to $30,000.  So what’s making up the difference? 
asked Taipale. It’s either venture capital money or cross-subsidization 
[within a company], he said.  Taipale’s conclusion from this data is that 
“the 400,000 jobs that the App Economy is supposedly creating doesn’t 
necessarily mean long-term, middle class jobs for the economy.”5 
If power-curve distributions become the norm in the new economy, 
said Taipale, it could result in greater social polarization and even 
social disruption.  It is not clear what should be done about this trend, 
however, particularly if it might disrupt productivity and growth.  For 
Taipale, the vexing question is:  “How do we redistribute the spoils 
(or opportunities) to maintain a system in which there is sufficiently 
widespread prosperity to avoid the problems of political distribution 
that Krugman proposes in his column, i.e., ‘class struggle’ by politically 
empowering ‘labor’ to demand its fair share.”  Taipale thinks it is a bet-
ter strategy to focus on devising a suitable economic architecture for fair 
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allocations of wealth and income in the first place, rather than mandate 
new redistribution schemes, because the latter are far more prone to the 
vagaries of politics.
As Taipale sees it, there are only a few choices:  “Regulate freedom—
or redistribute the spoils at the backend, through tax policy.  Or do 
nothing and live with it.”  By this formulation, Taipale explained that if 
governments are going to intervene to address the problem of power-
curve distributions, they can either constrain markets and/or the archi-
tectural design of technical systems in the first place—which amounts 
to a regulation of opportunities and freedom—or they can redistribute 
the spoils of the economy after the fact.  Both choices involve some level 
of political choice, but the latter may be more subject to cronyism and 
political muscle than the former.
In any case, it is inescapable that the power-law curve has social 
implications.  The question is how far can you let those inequalities 
continue before the social implications become troublesome.
In his response, Bill Coleman, the venture capitalist, challenged some 
of the assumptions in Taipale’s analysis.  (This account draws upon the 
original Taipale-Coleman email exchange as well as the conference 
itself.)  In essence, Coleman believes that we are in a period of historic 
economic transition that will eventually result in greater prosperity, 
widely distributed, if the economy is allowed to pursue its course.  We 
should take comfort in the course of the Industrial Revolution, he 
said, which, despite a rocky transition from a more agrarian society, 
ultimately created a higher standard of living and a broad middle class. 
At the turn of the 20th century, said Coleman, the U.S. had wide-
spread child labor, no public education, limited electricity, and a 
university system for elites only.  But as a result of “disruptive innova-
tions ranging from globalism, financial services, information technol-
ogy, transportation and medicine, to mention but a few, as well as the 
Populist movement, a mass economy emerged which built the middle 
class.”  This provided an emancipation from the power-curve distribu-
tion of wealth and income that prevailed between 1860 and 1920, he 
said.  “Inequality really began to change,” Coleman said, “when Henry 
Ford realized that if Ford and other businesses did not create a middle 
class, businesses would not be able to sell their products.  And this 
strategy did raise all boats, and the average income of the world went up 
quite dramatically.  That’s what productivity does,” he said.  
So Coleman’s critique about the power-curve economy looks to 
industrial history and concludes, “We have just gotten off the ground 
[with an epochal wave of new innovation], and our problems are a result 
of our success.”  We can grow past our current power-curve inequalities 
and disruptions, but we need to look at the long sweep of history.  “The 
Industrial Revolution was about an increase in the capital base and the 
leveraging of capital and a higher velocity of capital, starting with the 
Dutch 400 years ago.  There are only two ways to get a ‘free lunch’ in 
economics—through innovation and specialization—and that’s how 
productivity improved.  The rest is all just redistribution of capital.” 
The “Internet Revolution” will bring about higher standards of living 
just as the Industrial Revolution did, said Coleman, who predicted that 
“the next 100 years will raise the average productivity of the world so 
high that there will be no need for anyone to have to live in poverty.”
Coleman continued:  “The basis of the problem [of unequal distri-
bution] has been unrelenting innovation and globalization.  Over the 
last century, the cycle from disruptive innovation to commoditization 
has shortened as globalization has made creative destruction easier and 
faster.  As this has proceeded, incremental innovation and automation 
have further accelerated productivity, ultimately automating all but the 
highest value-added positions in the economy.  In fact, the total num-
ber of manufacturing jobs in the world has been decreasing for almost 
twenty years.”
In light of his theory of sweeping historical cycles of innovation, 
Coleman believes that the economic future resembles a “glass half-full,” 
not half-empty.  The productivity revolution being ushered in by the 
Internet and digital technologies will reprise the Industrial Revolution in 
a new guise, he said:  “In the coming century, capital costs and barriers 
to entry will be fundamentally disrupted, and human self-actualization 
on an individual basis will drive participation in an open, global chain of 
commerce,” said Coleman.  “In the coming ‘pull world,’ where everyone 
has the opportunity to participate, people will work through ‘guilds’ in 
every specialty—music, writing, film and even law, medicine and finan-
cial services.  I also believe in an evolution of monetization, in which 
guilds (not unions) will lead innovation and demand compensation 
commensurate with their contributions.  Meanwhile, the concept of a 
vertical enterprise will morph as it becomes more adaptive and fluid.”
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In Coleman’s scenario, the power-curve economy is a transitional, 
disruptive phenomenon that will eventually produce much greater 
prosperity and broad social distributions of gains.  So in terms of job 
creation, he disagreed with Taipale’s analysis that “the power-curve 
economy is going to send us either into purgatory or hell.”
Is the Power-Curve Economy that Influential?
Some conference participants questioned the basic premise of Taipale’s 
analysis that the U.S. is moving from a “bell-curve nation” to a “power-
curve nation.”  Michael Mandel, the former Business Week journalist who 
is now the Chief Economic Strategist for the Progressive Policy Institute, 
questioned whether the economy at large, and even the App Economy, 
are in fact exhibiting power-law distributions.  “The power-law assumes 
that everything in the system is functioning in the same way.  But the 
data show that there’s a lot of App Economy hiring outside of the power 
law; there are churches and nonprofits doing so, for example.  If you 
overlay such things over the data, the distributions no longer look quite 
so explosive.”  In the same vein, Robert Pepper of Cisco Systems, Inc., 
questioned whether U.S. wealth and income distribution was ever subject 
to a bell-curve distribution.  Perhaps the bell-curve description of the 
“old economy” is a bit too simplistic, he suggested.
“The App Economy is part of the solution,  
not the problem.” - Julius Genachowski 
Julius Genachowski challenged Taipale’s negative assessment of the 
App Economy, asserting that “the App Economy is part of the solution, 
not the problem.  The fact that venture capitalists may be underwriting 
new companies and apps is not a negative, even if those ventures fail,” 
said Genachowski.  Those are positive developments because they are 
bets that those companies will succeed and become platforms for many 
new jobs.  Moreover, the App Economy is helping to create “new cat-
egories of jobs,” he said, at a time when many “old categories” of jobs 
are going away forever.  “This trajectory is very positive, and it’s more 
likely to create many more jobs in the future than it did in the past.”  
Finally, Genachowski said, the declining costs of technological inno-
vation are opening up opportunities for many small businesses and 
ordinary people to enter the App Economy.  This itself is helping to 
mitigate the impact of power-curve dynamics, he said.  One example is 
Amazon’s Web Services Division, which provides cheap and affordable 
access to data storage, servers and computing services to small businesses 
that might not otherwise be able to afford such high-end technologies.6 
Jerry Murdock, Co-Founder and Managing Director of Insight 
Venture Partners, elaborated on this trend, noting that the App 
Economy is likely to really take off when “the local Internet” matures 
as a business opportunity. Murdock sees local data as transforming the 
Internet into a more personal, utilitarian experience, but he assesses 
the local content on his smartphone today at only 5 percent.  When 
local data becomes the “major chunk” of smartphone content, he says, 
“that’s when the App Economy becomes real.”
Yet amidst these positive signs, Laura Bailyn, Senior Director at 
the Markle Foundation, reminded people that poverty and inequality 
remain a stark human reality in America today.  “One in four children 
in the U.S. today are hungry,” she said.  “Their parents don’t have 
enough money to eat, and the limited resources that they do have are 
spent on very calorie-dense, inexpensive foods, which of course leads to 
obesity, which leads to chronic illness and a lifetime of suffering—and 
a great deal of expense for our economy.”
Leila Janah, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Samasource, 
questioned whether the App Economy would truly yield the economic 
gains that we need.  The problem, she said, is that the App Economy 
is a more precarious alternative to an economy with full-time jobs 
that have benefits.  In the App Economy, companies offer short-term, 
freelance assignments that provide little stability and no benefits. 
Productivity gains do not necessarily accrue to workers, she argued, 
because “the technology reduces transaction costs and friction, making 
it easier to divvy up full-time jobs into freelance jobs.  Companies can 
then pay a person half of what they would have paid a person to do it 
full time, and get freelancers to work half-time.”  
This is producing a distressing “portfolio approach” to income 
among many low-wage people in the U.S. and developing countries 
alike, Janah noted. “People earn a paycheck by doing six or seven dif-
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ferent economic activities, none of which are particularly productive or 
stable,” she said.  “These dynamics are changing the nature of work in 
ways that don’t always benefit the worker.” 
But perhaps inequality is not as severe as it seems.  Some confer-
ence participants believe that statistics measuring income inequality 
are exaggerated because government support programs such as food 
stamps and welfare serve as substitutes for income.  A more meaningful 
measure of disparities in social well-being would be consumption levels, 
not income, they argued.  
“We’re going to have to invent a new set of 
narratives, a new set of common-sense terms, 
to understand the realities in a power-curve 
economy.” – John Seely Brown   
Conversely, Philip Auerswald, Associate Professor at the George 
Mason School of Public Policy, pointed out that many technological 
innovations are creating social benefits outside of the marketplace, 
which means that standard economic metrics may fail to capture them. 
For example, in certain areas where there has been innovation, such as 
the sharing of digital music, “There may be fewer transactions and less 
monetization occurring—but greater enjoyment of life.  That’s not a 
bad thing.  But the statistics for market transactions aren’t capturing 
well-being,” Auerswald said.
This raises a very interesting question about our very notions of 
valuation, said John Seely Brown of Deloitte Center for the Edge:  “If 
we shift our narrative to focus not just on financial capital, but on social 
capital, we can begin to start looking at how we actually value social 
capital, reputational capital and the quality of life.”
The problem with the power-curve economy, he said, is that it disrupts 
our “cognitive architecture”—the stories that we tell to make sense of the 
world.  In the bell-curve economy, stories could be taken as representative 
case examples—but in the power-curve economy, that representational 
logic is flawed.  Stories are not prototypical when there are “scale-invari-
ant power laws,” meaning there are radical discontinuities (in income, 
performance, rewards) between one level and the next increment and 
that averages are not meaningful.  “In such an environment,” said Brown, 
“there is no example that is representative of anything else.  And so, since 
we tend to reason from example, we are exceptionally poor when our past 
strategies and mental models don’t carry over to this new world.”
As an example, he cited the challenge of persuading very sophisticat-
ed university presidents and trustees that perhaps the value of intellec-
tual property generated by their institutions might be seen in broader 
ways—leading to different policies to manage such knowledge.  But 
invariably, such discussions focus on a few aberrational, high-earning 
patents that make billions of dollars for the institutions, as if they were 
representative stories.  Brown’s point:  “We’re going to have to invent a 
new set of narratives, a new set of common-sense terms, to understand 
the realities in a power-curve economy.”
Jobs in the Power-Curve Nation
How might the power curve be affecting the creation and distribution 
of jobs in the U.S.?  Two MIT professors—Erik Brynjolfsson, Director 
of the MIT Center for Digital Business, and Andrew McAfee, Associate 
Director and Principal Research Scientist at the Center for Digital 
Business—addressed this issue, drawing upon their 2011 book, Race 
Against the Machine.  The book’s thesis is captured in its subtitle:  How 
the Digital Revolution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity 
and Irreversibly Transforming Employment and the Economy.  
Brynjolfsson and McAfee explore the special role that digital tech-
nologies seem to be playing in restructuring the economy, work and 
incomes.  The authors are especially interested in how technology can 
simultaneously boost innovation and productivity while eliminating 
jobs faster than new ones are created.  They are also concerned with 
declines in median household income levels.  In his presentation, 
Brynjolfsson noted, “Productivity is making the pie bigger, but it is 
entirely possible that some people, even a majority of people, are being 
made worse off by these advances in productivity.”  This is the “race 
against the machine” described in the book title—the relentless effort 
by workers to try to capture their share of gains from productivity and 
technological innovation, and not fall behind or be made unemployable.
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“It may seem paradoxical that faster progress can hurt wages and 
jobs for millions of people,” write Brynjolfsson and McAfee in their 
book, “but we argue that’s what’s been happening.”  They contend that 
the accelerated pace of innovation is causing enormous displacement of 
jobs and reductions in income, especially as new technologies encroach 
on human skills once thought to be impossible to automate.  The pro-
fessors call this phenomenon “digital encroachment.”
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The two charts above illustrate how productivity has been rising for 
the past 10 to 15 years, along with Gross Domestic Product—and yet 
private employment levels and real median household incomes have 
both stagnated.  “The person in the 50th percentile is not really seeing 
any benefit,” said Brynjolfsson.  “The pie is getting bigger, but most of 
that is going to a relatively small group of people.  About 65 percent of 
the income growth in the past ten years has been earned by less than 1 
percent of the American people.” 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee offer three basic theories to explain the 
mismatches between economic winners and losers.  The theories cen-
ter on “divergences between higher-skilled and lower-skilled workers; 
between superstars and everyone else; and between labor and capital.”  
The first theory points to a “skills-bias” in new technologies.  The 
economic benefits of new technologies tend to accrue more to higher-
skilled, more educated workers than to less-skilled, less-educated work-
ers.  Brynjolfsson and McAfee also point to the rise of the “superstar 
economy” as a factor that is aggravating economic inequality.  Recent 
rounds of technological innovation are notable for enabling a small 
group of very talented “superstars” to replicate their talents, via soft-
ware, thereby reaping disproportionate rewards from their work.  
While the amplification is especially visible in software and digital 
media, it is evident to some degree in almost every industry, as more 
and more processes are embedded in digital platforms. They cited as 
an example the CVS drugstore chain, which seized upon an innovation 
in its prescription drug ordering system at one of its pharmacies and 
replicated it at more than 4,000 CVS retail locations nationwide via an 
enterprise information system.  The story illustrates how technological 
innovation can prove to be far more influential in boosting productiv-
ity than, say, the skills of store managers at each of those locations. 
Similarly, said Brynjolfsson, “Information technologies have given 
CEOs a greater span of control over their companies.  This means that 
the incrementally better performance of a CEO has a bigger impact on a 
company than previously.”  This is the “superstar” effect that informa-
tion technology enables and amplifies, said Brynjolfsson.
Brynjolfsson and McAfee cautioned that technology is not exclusively 
responsible for these types of changes; public policy, tax changes and 
globalization are also very important factors.  But they believe that 
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digital encroachment onto activities that only humans were capable 
of performing is also a significant factor.  Only eight years ago, it was 
considered highly improbable that an autonomous, computer-driven 
automobile could ever be made because of the extreme difficulties in 
coordinating multiple sensory inputs, on-the-fly computing, machine 
learning about the formal rules of the road, etc.  However, in 2012, 
Google introduced a completely autonomous test car that can drive 
down Interstate 101 near its offices in Mountain View, California.  In 
another feat of advanced engineering, IBM has designed a supercom-
puter named Watson that beat the top-ranking Jeopardy quiz show 
player of all time, Ken Jennings, in a televised competition.  Jennings 
had once won 74 Jeopardy games in a row.  After Watson defeated 
Jennings, Jennings joked, “I, for one, welcome our new computer 
overlords.”
Finally, Brynjolfsson and McAfee believe that inequality is worsen-
ing as capital reaps a higher share of productivity gains relative to labor. 
Throughout most of the 20th century, the respective shares of produc-
tivity gains reaped by labor and capital were unequal but fairly stable. 
After the year 2000, however, “The share of GDP going to labor fell off 
quite rapidly, and the share going to capital is at record highs right now, 
both in terms of profits and other metrics,” said Brynjolfsson.  “For the 
typical worker, this disparity is even greater than the statistics suggest 
because the numbers for ‘labor’ include the multi-million-dollar sala-
ries of CEOs and senior executives.”  
In his recent book, The Price of Inequality, economist Joseph E. 
Stiglitz has pointed out that inequality does not just affect the qual-
ity of social life but also economic performance.  He summarizes his 
argument:  “Inequality leads to lower growth and less efficiency.  Lack 
of opportunity means that its most valuable asset—its people—is not 
being fully used.  Many at the bottom, or even in the middle, are not 
living up to their potential, because the rich, needing few public ser-
vices and worried that a strong government might redistribute income, 
use their political influence to cut taxes and curtail government spend-
ing.  This leads to underinvestment in infrastructure, education and 
technology, impeding the engines of growth….”7 
The sting of inequality is made worse by another trend:  declining 
economic mobility in American society.  It is becoming harder for 
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children to improve upon their parents’ standard of living.  If you are 
born into the bottom income quintile of U.S. households, said McAfee, 
you are likely to stay in that quintile for your life as well.  Interestingly, 
inequality is growing even in countries that have historically been 
quite egalitarian, such as Sweden.  An ingenious study by Peter Tufano 
and colleagues vividly illustrated the practical meaning of worsening 
inequality.  It showed that nearly 50 percent of U.S. households are in 
such a precarious financial state that, if an emergency struck, they could 
not come up with $2,000 within 30 days.8
Technology has been both creating and destroying jobs for centuries, 
Brynjolfsson acknowledged, but he believes that something different 
is happening now.  “The job destruction seems to be happening a lot 
faster than new job creation.  As tasks performed by tax preparers, 
bank tellers and people at airline checkout counters are automated, we 
need to come up with new industries that can gainfully employ those 
people.”
In response to the Brynjolfsson/McAfee presentation, Reed Hundt 
suggested that a more accurate term for the “superstar economy” might 
be the “big winners economy”—because “superstars” implies that 
the winners’ sheer talent took them to the top.  In fact, said Hundt, 
“Intellectual property law and tax law have created an environment 
over the last thirty years in which it has been almost certain that there 
would be a category of big winners.  The marginal income tax rate is 
less than half of what it was thirty years ago, for example.  These rules 
have allowed big winners to continue to aggregate wealth without any 
demonstration that their work will in fact generate new wealth.”  The 
concentration of wealth is intensified, said Hundt, as wealthy people 
buy the machines that are used to generate more wealth, displacing or 
marginalizing labor.
The statistics bear out this polarization of wealth.  One in six 
Americans lives in a family of four that makes less than $22,300, said 
Leila Janah of Samasource.  She noted that the official government 
standards for determining poverty have not been adjusted in more 
than a generation.  But Janah believes that technology can be a source 
of many new jobs because humans will always be needed to supplement 
what computers can do. Her company hires many people in less 
developed countries to use human judgment and skills to augment 
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computer-based optical character recognition, voice transcriptions, 
and so on.   
Robert Atkinson, Founder and President of the Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation, took issue with much of the 
analysis presented.  “I just don’t buy the notion that it has been returns 
to capital that have been the driver of increased inequality,” he said, 
noting how contemporary corporate profit rates parallel those of the 
1960s, a period when there was a wide sharing of gains among median 
income-earners.  Atkinson also challenged the idea that new technolo-
gies disproportionately benefit the higher-skilled and better educated, 
noting that there is huge income inequality even among college edu-
cated workers. 
Atkinson also believes that “productivity has been significantly over-
stated in the national income accounts by about 30 percent over the 
past decade. Adjusting that reduces the size of the income disparities 
somewhat.  Finally, since 2000 about one-third of U.S. manufacturing 
jobs—or some 5.6 million jobs—have been lost. That’s something that 
no other country has ever done in world history.  That loss was not just 
about machines.  It was about globalization, too.”  Atkinson’s organiza-
tion estimates that about 60 percent of the job losses can be attributed 
to the loss of U.S. global competitiveness, and the remaining 40 percent 
to technology and productivity.
Atkinson concluded, “I really don’t think there is any fundamental 
problem with a loss of jobs from productivity gains, because the gains 
all go to the ‘income side’ (higher wages or lower prices); people spend 
them.  And by spending them, people will create more jobs at places like 
restaurants, television makers and airlines.  I don’t see the problem as a 
‘race against the machine.’”
Brynjolfsson pointed to the numbers:  “The assumption that you’re 
working with, implicitly or explicitly, is that productivity gains make 
everyone richer.  But you can’t ignore the data showing that the medi-
an-income worker has not benefited from productivity gains.  I think 
we have to seriously consider the possibility that the way technology 
is evolving, it is making particular job skills less valuable.  We need to 
think consciously about what we can do to make people with those 
skills and talents more valuable so that they can continue to partici-
pate.”
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Despite agreement that new technologies are providing valuable 
productivity gains and economic growth, there was a subtle but sig-
nificant division among conference participants about what issues 
require urgent attention.  “Without overemphasizing this,” said 
Charles Firestone of the Aspen Institute Communications and Society 
Program, “we can detect a split between those who see the new econo-
my as a natural phenomenon that we must come to accept—‘embrace 
the machines and figure out how to use them’—and those who worry 
about the people being left out economically, and who want to find 
effective interventions—government policies, institutional practices, 
education or other means—to help them.”
“Education is what you do to people; learning is 
what you do for yourself.”  - Joi Ito 
There was wide agreement that education is central to people’s abili-
ty to participate in the new economy, so much conversation focused on 
how education is changing (and not changing), and what strategies can 
help people compete in the new economy.  Joi Ito, Director of the MIT 
Media Lab, offered his own iconoclastic perspective on these questions. 
To Ito, there is a major divide between learning and education, and 
that difference is particularly important when it comes to the technol-
ogy-based economy.  “Education is what you do to people,” he said; 
“learning is what you do for yourself.”  Instead of trying to regiment stu-
dents into mastering a certain body of knowledge, Ito believes that we 
need to promote practice-based, experiential learning.  The learning/
education distinction is implicitly a critique of traditional education 
and its more rigid, backward-looking orientation.  
Ito regards much of American higher education as a “trailing indi-
cator” because people go to college and get graduate degrees in fields 
that are already well-established in its intellectual and credentialing 
systems.  “But as the world moves faster and faster,” said Ito, “students 
are not picking the right things to study because, even if they’re smart, 
they pick things that are already at the top.”  This approach virtually 
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assures a skills/jobs mismatch because technology and the economy are 
creating entirely new fields very rapidly, many established industries are 
declining, and job definitions are becoming highly malleable.  
“Schooling should not be about making someone 
a professional; it should be about making 
somebody a professional learner.”  - Joi Ito 
Speaking from her own experience, Ann Winblad, Co-Founder 
and Managing Director of Hummer Winblad Venture Partners, said 
that “there were no job descriptions for entrepreneurs and computer 
programmers decades ago.”  This meant that she had to overcome the 
“safety” of studying for a familiar, well-defined career.  This problem has 
become even more pervasive today as skill levels for new jobs continue 
to rise.  One of the biggest problems today, said Winblad, is that there 
are no easy ways to describe the new jobs being created—and therefore 
it is hard to make them an aspirational goal for students.  It’s also hard 
because the conventional “career escalators” and “ladders” are increas-
ingly disappearing, making it harder for people to plan their careers—a 
theme explored by Reid Hoffman’s book, The Startup of You, she said.
“The most appropriate solution to these sorts of problems,” said Ito 
“is to teach kids how to learn.  Schooling should not be about making 
someone a professional; it should be about making somebody a profes-
sional learner.”  Learning skills are especially important—as opposed 
to formal education—because “skills are arguably more critical to 
the economy than credentials alone,” said Ito. He continued: “At the 
MIT Media Lab, Ricardo Hausmann and Cesar Hidalgo did an analy-
sis of imports and exports over the past fifty years.9  They found that 
secondary education had almost no correlation to economic growth. 
Economic growth seems to be largely about the complexity of manu-
facturing that you can perform, and about the ‘adjacent spaces’ next to 
existing manufacturing sectors, not simply GDP.”  
Ito said that kids need to become engaged in participatory “con-
nected learning,” a topic that he is exploring with his sister, Mimi Ito, 
an anthropologist with the University of California, Irvine, and with 
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John Seely Brown.  The project is attempting to examine a fundamental 
question, “How do you get kids to want to learn?”  A hint at the answer 
is contained in the title of Mimi Ito’s 2009 book, Hanging Out, Messing 
Around and Geeking Out:  Kids Living and Learning with New Media. 
The book explores the social dynamics of peer learning and charts 
the progression that many kids make from “hanging out” to “messing 
around” (exploring a new challenge and developing a talent), and mov-
ing on to “geeking out” (becoming creatively engaged in developing a 
nerdy skill with social cachet).
“When you give people opportunities and a path 
towards a goal, all kinds of people show up and 
invest in themselves.” - Shantanu Sinha 
The most interesting and rewarding jobs of the future are likely to 
require entrepreneurial talents, practice-based skills and a healthy sense 
of anti-authoritarianism, said Ito.  Unfortunately, traditional education 
tends to stay confined within disciplines, “which teach more and more 
about less and less,” while the more rigorous ways of learning come 
through social practice.  “A lot of jobs are ‘pigeonhole jobs,’ ” Ito con-
ceded, but he stressed, “We need ‘anti-disciplinary’ jobs for people who 
don’t fit into any pigeonholes.  How do you raise those kids, hire them 
and match them with jobs?”  
Ito offered a number of educational principles that he believes 
should guide future educational reform.  These principles are:
Resilience over strength.
Pull over push.
Risk over safety.
Systems over objects.
Compasses over maps.
Practice over theory.
Disobedience over compliance.
Emergence over authority.
Learning over education.
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In many respects, Khan Academy, the nonprofit educational website 
with over 3,400 video learning modules and a global network of six 
million users, embodies many of Ito’s principles.  The popular website 
caters to the “student, teacher, home-schooler, principal, adult returning 
to the classroom after 20 years, or a friendly alien just trying to get a leg 
up in earthly biology.”  Shantanu Sinha, President and Chief Operating 
Officer of Khan Academy, said that a huge number of people who learn 
through Khan Academy are probably at the extremes of the bell curve: 
“They are self-motivated people who want to get into Harvard and they 
are fifth-graders studying trigonometry.  There are also many people 
who are left behind by the traditional educational system.”  
Sinha sees Khan Academy as “proof of the power of the human spirit 
when people really want to learn.  When you give people opportuni-
ties and a path towards a goal, all kinds of people show up and invest 
in themselves.  The levels of engagement increase tremendously.”  One 
lesson that might be learned from the Khan Academy style of learning 
is:  Lower the barriers to educational access and encourage participa-
tion, open source style—and then let innovation and jobs emerge from 
that spirit of engagement.  The participatory paradigm pioneered by 
open source software communities is expanding into other digital 
realms such as 3D printing and bio-fabs, where “guilds” of self-moti-
vated practitioners are the leaning innovators. 
This vision of practice-based innovation may be appealing, but does 
it scale?
James Manyika, Director of the McKinsey Global Institute, said he 
loves the idea of the App Economy and participatory learning, but “how 
scalable are these answers in an economy that needs 3.5 billion jobs? 
Do they only apply to a small group or entrepreneurial class?  Can they 
solve the macro-employment challenge?”  Manyika wondered whether 
contemporary institutions could in fact accommodate people who fol-
low Ito’s ideals of work and innovation, and whether everybody could 
learn in social, participatory ways.  After all, any economy has enormous 
numbers of jobs that involve repetitive, boring, measureable tasks. 
Ito is convinced that the Internet can help scale learning among 
small, practice- based groups into larger, commercially meaningful 
networks.  He described a group of young people from East Detroit 
who repair bicycles whom he once connected with their counterparts 
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in Kenya, leading to Internet-mediated dialogues and fruitful col-
laborations.  Similarly, the Internet is being used by many small urban 
farmers to develop supply chains that would otherwise not exist.  The 
Internet is also fueling the “maker movement” of do-it-yourself arti-
sans, inventors and tinkerers.  “The neat thing about the Internet is the 
connections that it builds among people,” said Ito.  “I do think it scales 
for small tasks.” 
Ito also noted how small, networked players can often act more 
swiftly, more resourcefully than large institutions.  He cited his own 
experiences in mobilizing a network of radiation experts following the 
March 2011 earthquake in Japan:  “I knew nothing about radiation 
or radiation management, but within a week I knew more about how 
to measure, visualize and document radiation than anybody in the 
Japanese government.  Today, we have taken four million radiation 
measurements.  A small group of scrappy nonprofit people were able 
to do more after the earthquake than the government, after its decades 
of planning.”
Several conference participants bemoaned the tendency of large 
institutions to see “jobs” in very static, conventional ways.  As a result, 
most foreign aid to developing countries seeks to create “good jobs,” 
which means conventional corporate or government jobs.  And while 
that is helpful in one respect, in another respect such monies would be 
better spent on new models of self-directed learning and innovation, 
said Leila Janah of Samasource.  She noted that even illiterate people 
can have useful feedback about work that can boost productivity, but 
“large institutions don’t see this as ‘learning.’  They have no idea how 
to invest in this kind of learning.”
For John Seely Brown, the inability of large institutions to embrace 
networked learning and innovation suggests a deeper problem:  “bro-
ken institutional architectures.”  By that, he means “twentieth century 
systems” that simply cannot accommodate fluid new forms of collabo-
ration, sharing and innovation.  “We may be trying to put a new wine 
in an old bottle, and it isn’t working.  It could be that large scale corpo-
rations can’t produce value anymore, and they may be useless in terms 
of helping us grow new talent.”  Brown suggested that we re-think the 
purpose of the corporation by seeing it as an institution for “scalable 
learning and talent development.”
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Can large corporations transform themselves in these directions? 
Padmasree Warrior, Chief Technology and Strategy Officer at Cisco 
Systems, told of an experiment in restructuring at Cisco seven years 
ago:  “Cisco went to a model of pursuing market adjacencies through a 
collaborative internal structure with boards and councils.  This model 
was too early in the accountability framework. [CEO] John Chambers’ 
course corrected the company to focus on five priorities and has 
engaged in a successful transformation.”  
What happened in this model at Cisco, said Warrior, is that “par-
ticipation in a project was not necessarily linked to results, so when 
no results were produced, everyone said, ‘Not my problem.  I didn’t 
own that.  I was just a participant.’”  The challenge in instituting a pull 
model of participatory innovation within a large corporation is finding 
ways to drive accountability and ownership of results, said Warrior. 
The key to accountability in any structure is decision rights, according 
to Warrior.  Since undertaking this experiment, Cisco has since retreat-
ed “halfway” to an older, more conventional corporate structure, she 
said.  All the engineering is now together in one place, which avoids the 
fragmentation of corporate divisions and focuses decision-making with 
clear lines of sight, a change that has advantages and disadvantages.  
The key to accountability in any structure  
is decision rights. - Padmasree Warrior 
For all the criticism directed at traditional, hierarchical institutions, 
Andrew McAfee, the MIT scientist, pointed to two strong affirmations 
of the status quo.  First, a group of prominent European researchers 
recently concluded that American firms are among the best managed 
in the world.  Traditional American management still earns a great deal 
of admiration, even among foreigners.  Second, when Gallup CEO Jim 
Clifton commissioned a series of global surveys to understand what 
people want, said McAfee, Clifton was struck by a recurrent desire 
mentioned by nearly everyone no matter where they lived:  the desire 
for a good job.  “The primary goal of the world is no longer peace or 
freedom or even democracy,” Clifton wrote.  “It is not about having a 
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family and it is neither about God nor about owning a home or land. 
The will of the world is first and foremost to have a good job.”  
The idea of a “good job” is generally seen as a stable employer, a 
steady paycheck and at least 30 hours a week.  This ideal, paradoxically, 
is increasingly less sustainable in the new economy.  It would appear 
that people’s near-universal desires and current economic trends are 
going in opposite directions.
Government Policies and Leadership Responsibilities
Much of the conference discussions focused on the diminishing 
ability of technological innovation, productivity and economic growth 
to address a series of worrisome social trends.  Historically, these eco-
nomic forces have bolstered the middle class and social opportunity; 
in recent years, however, their ability to create new jobs and career 
opportunities, mitigate inequality, and help improve education and 
meet other social needs, has declined.  Americans in the middle- and 
lower-third income levels, and especially young people, are pessimistic 
about the future.
As Reed Hundt, former FCC Chairman, pointed out, the ratio of 
people employed to the general population is a useful measure of a 
country’s social and economic health.  A ratio of 70 percent is consid-
ered great while 50 percent is dismal.  In the U.S., the employment/
population ratio was 65 percent in 2000.  That ratio has now declined 
to 58 percent.  Meanwhile, the overall, official unemployment rate is 
8.3 percent.  Although the steep job losses of the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis have eased, the same general downward trends that have prevailed 
over the past thirty years (with the exception of the 1995-2000 boom) 
continue today.
A final session of this conference dealt with possible “solution catego-
ries” that governments and policy leaders might advance to deal with 
these trends.  The specifics of any single solution could not be adequately 
addressed here, but there was a broad consensus that meaningful reforms 
must attempt to stimulate new public and private investment; improve 
public education; foster a spirit of entrepreneurship; and expand the U.S. 
relationship with the rest of the world, especially in trade.  At a more 
intangible, cultural level, there is a need to come up with a new, more 
credible grand narrative for economic security and social progress.
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It helps to name some of the hidden presumptions about economic 
and social progress that may no longer be operative.  James Manyika of 
the McKinsey Global Institute identified four such presumptions that 
may need to be re-thought:
•	 “So	long	as	the	economy	is	going	great,	jobs	and	other	things	
will do fine, too.”
•	 “Innovation	 and	 productivity	 is	 going	 to	 stimulate	 the	 same	
kind of employment growth as it has in the past.”
•	 “What	was	good	 for	a	corporation	 fifty	years	ago	 is	probably	
good for America, and vice versa.”
•	 Our	 individual	 interests	 as	 consumers,	 workers,	 citizens	 and	
investors are more or less identical and aligned.  
Each of these ideas now seems problematic, said Manyika.  Increases 
in GDP no longer necessarily boost employment.  Productivity gains 
are not flowing to workers in the proportionate measures that they 
once did.  And as commerce has become more globalized, corporations 
can now pick and choose the countries to which they will bring invest-
ment, technology and employment.  Countries are often regarded as 
superior or deficient “service environments” (in Joi Ito’s phrase) for 
serving corporate needs.  
“GDP…is not a meaningful target for the  
twenty-first century.” - Philip Auerswald 
Another presumption that may be limited or mistaken is the idea 
that GDP is the best metric for social and personal well-being, said Phil 
Auerswald, Associate Professor at the George Mason School of Public 
Policy.  “The most rapidly growing country of the past fifty years,” 
he said, “is Equatorial Guinea.  That’s because of resource extraction. 
There’s no real development whatsoever.  The point is that GDP may 
measure something better than nothing, and it may serve as a guidepost 
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for public policy, but it is not a meaningful target for the twenty-first 
century.  When we talk about well-being in society and what it is to be 
a human being, we don’t have measures for that.”
Lasting solutions will need to look beyond short-term political or 
electoral needs, and focus on longer-term structural change in the fol-
lowing areas:
Public and private investment.  A number of conference participants 
made the point that spending on infrastructure is one way to serve 
both public and private needs, while stimulating economic growth and 
jobs.  Rob Atkinson of the Information Technology and Innovation 
Foundation said that the U.S. ranks 27th in the generosity of its tax 
credit for research and development.  He urged improvement there 
as well as more generous incentives for investments in worker train-
ing and new machinery and equipment.  More generally, he believes 
that the U.S. needs to develop “a big-picture vision of transforming 
American society through digital platforms.”
Public education reform.  There was widespread agreement among 
participants that the American educational system does not do a very 
good job of producing literate, skilled workers.  Much of higher edu-
cation seems more focused on narrow fields of disciplinary inquiry 
rather than practice-driven skills development, which is arguably more 
important for job-seekers and for national economies.  There are a 
number of innovative projects that are stimulating self-motivated 
learning—and not just formal education to obtain professional creden-
tials—but recognition and support for the former remains very limited.
Support for entrepreneurship.   The “secular trend in entrepreneur-
ship is a downward trend” in two senses, according to Andrew McAfee 
of MIT.  The number of new businesses started and the new number 
of jobs that they create, are trending downward, he said.  He also 
pointed to the “regulatory thicket” as an impediment to new business 
creation that needs to be resolved.  A recent study by the New America 
Foundation’s Markets, Enterprise and Resiliency Initiative concluded: 
“The number of new entrepreneurs and business owners has been 
dropping—as a percent of the working-age population—for more than 
a generation, declining by 53 percent between 1977 and 2010. The share 
of self-employed Americans, meanwhile, has been declining since 1991; 
by 2010 it had dropped by more than 20 percent.”10 
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A more expansive U.S. relationship with the rest of the world, especially 
in trade.   Economic and social policy is often made with little regard 
for global dynamics, said Bright Simons, President of the mPedigree 
Network, the biggest network of telecom companies in the world dedi-
cated to addressing the counterfeit medicines threat in Africa and South 
Asia (www.mPedigree.net).  Simons noted that the U.S. exports only 
$23 billion worth of goods to sub-Saharan Africa and yet it imports $90 
billion.  “This massive trade deficit tells you that Africa is the biggest 
opportunity for the U.S. because there are frontier markets to be devel-
oped,” Simons said.  “If the U.S. were to expand its trade with Africa by 
ten-fold, to say 50 percent per annum, that would be sufficient to create 
more than 500,000 jobs over a three-year cycle.”
As a general strategic approach, Reed Hundt is skeptical that cur-
rent policies to boost economic growth and incomes could ever allevi-
ate inequality or produce a sufficient quality of life for all people.  He 
acknowledged that the standard economic wisdom is to try to do so. 
The basic idea is to improve productivity and thereby incomes in order 
to help people buy a better standard of living.  “That has no chance of 
working,” said Hundt.  “No chance.”  That’s because the benefits of 
productivity are reaped by some citizens, but not all citizens, he said. 
“If you look at productivity gains over the past twenty years, you’ll find 
that they have not benefited all citizens.”  Current economic trends 
aggravating inequality “are very hard to reverse,” said Hundt, “and they 
won’t be reversed in any rapid way, perhaps not for generations.  After 
all, we have had this trend for forty years.”  
But if neither governments nor the economy can assure a broader 
distribution of productivity gains, what might be a viable alternative? 
Hundt suggested that attention be focused on how to capture the 
efficiencies and value that networks can generate, and then distribute 
them at no cost to those who need them.  In other words, leverage 
some of the benefits generated by open networks, whether through 
market activity or non-market collaborations.  This could be a fruit-
ful approach to generating social benefits beyond the exclusive pursuit 
of higher income and redistribution of wealth (which many people 
oppose for philosophical or political reasons in any case, he noted).
Phil Auerswald of George Mason University had a categorical piece 
of advice for policymakers: stop favoring incumbents so much.  His ratio-
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nale:  it crowds out innovative approaches that are desperately needed. 
“By favoring incumbents less, you can help create a space for the 
future,” he said.  Auerswald pointed to philanthropic and government 
support for stodgy, old-style educational institutions.  “All this good-
will toward educational incumbents is actually making the problem 
much worse,” he said, arguing that it entrenches archaic institutional 
practices rather than nurturing more appropriate, innovative ones.   
Conclusion
The challenges of the power-curve economy are formidable indeed. 
In the more optimistic scenario, the coming surges of productivity, 
innovation and economic growth will be disruptive, but tolerable and 
hopeful because they will also usher in enormous efficiencies and 
bounties that could eradicate poverty and improve standards of living. 
Under this scenario, the transition we are in must be understood as 
something on the scale of the Industrial Revolution itself.  
In a more troubling scenario, the power-curve economy poses a 
series of disruptions that have no easy or recognized solutions.  We 
appear headed for a greater polarization into haves and have-nots and 
more acute economic hardship and unemployment.  Greater social and 
political unrest seem inevitable if no interventions are taken to deal 
with the current arc of economic activity.  
Clearly the discussion about how to anticipate and address the 
dynamics of the power-curve economy is still in its very early stages. 
It will take more study to reach a deeper understanding of the socio-
economic and technological dynamics at play.  We will need more time 
to see how technological innovation and network effects play out in 
specific industry sectors, and what general conclusions might be drawn 
from such developments.  
The worlds of politics and public policy may have the steepest learning 
curve to navigate, however, because so many of its guiding narratives are 
based on twentieth-century economics and governance models.  Much 
more serious attention must therefore be paid to the “edge” of contem-
porary technology, networks, markets and culture, where the harbingers 
of the future first manifest themselves before moving to the center.  But 
even this task requires escaping the gravitational pull of established insti-
tutions and treating emergent phenomena with greater seriousness.
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This report is an early attempt to do just that.  But we if are to truly 
understand the emerging power-curve economy and its social ramifica-
tions, and if we wish to maintain a sustainable balance between innova-
tion, opportunity and social equity, we must probe more deeply into 
the challenges explored in the preceding pages.  It seems likely that we 
need to devise entirely new sorts of policy approaches and institutional 
systems to deal with the novel, global dynamics of the power-curve 
economy.  
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describing new business models for the networked environment, explor-
ing topics of innovation and specialization. Among the more creative 
concepts propounded at the Roundtable was an analysis of the world’s 
economy in terms of video game theory that suggests that if developing 
countries are not incorporated into the world economic community in 
some acceptable way—if they cannot make economic progress—they 
could become disrupters to the entire economic or communications sys-
tem. The report also explores issues of outsourcing and insourcing in the 
context of digital technologies moving work to the worker instead of vice 
versa. Participants concentrated on developments in India and China, 
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economy. 57 pages, ISBN Paper: 0-89843-427-0, $12.00 per copy.
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projecting their messages globally. The author further explores the rela-
tionships between the soft power of persuasion and the more tradition-
al hard power of the military and discusses how governments will have 
to pay close attention to newly burgeoning social communities in order 
to prosper. 68 pages, ISBN Paper: 0-89843-396-7, $12.00 per copy.
The Rise of Netpolitik: How the Internet Is Changing International 
Politics and Diplomacy (2002)
David Bollier, rapporteur
How are the Internet and other digital technologies changing the con-
duct of world affairs?  What do these changes mean for our understanding 
of power in international relations and how political interests are and will 
be pursued?  The Rise of Netpolitik explores the sweeping implications of 
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international diplomacy, politics, commerce, and cultural identity.  The 
report begins with a look at how the velocity of information and the diver-
sification of information sources are complicating international diplo-
macy.  It further addresses geopolitical and military implications, as well 
as how the Internet is affecting cross-cultural and political relationships. 
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and other technologies bring our competing stories into closer proximity 
with each other and stories will be interpreted in different ways by differ-
ent cultures.  69 pages, ISBN Paper: 0-89843-368-1, $12.00 per copy.
The Internet Time Lag: Anticipating the Long-Term Consequences of the 
Information Revolution (2001)
Evan Schwartz, rapporteur
Some of the unintended consequences of the Internet and the free-
doms it symbolizes are now rushing to the fore. We now know that 
the network of terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center and 
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of recent years—such as the contraction of hierarchies, instant commu-
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bubble? What is the next new economy? What are the broader social 
consequences of the answers to those earlier questions? This report takes 
a wide-ranging look at the economic, business, social, and political con-
sequences of the Internet, as well as its ramifications for the process of 
globalization.  58 pages, ISBN Paper: 0-89843-331-2, $12.00 per copy.
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This report looks critically at key insights on the new economy and 
its implications in light of the digital revolution. The report begins with 
an examination of the interplay between the current economy and the 
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issues of race and diversity, and the free flow of digital goods, services and 
ideas across borders.
Most conferences employ the signature Aspen Institute seminar 
format:  approximately 25 leaders from diverse disciplines and per-
spectives engaged in roundtable dialogue, moderated with the goal of 
driving the agenda to specific conclusions and recommendations.  The 
program distributes our conference reports and other materials to key 
policymakers, opinion leaders and the public in the United States and 
around the world.  We also use the Internet and social media to inform 
and ignite broader conversations that foster greater participation in the 
democratic process.
The Program’s Executive Director is Charles M. Firestone.  He has 
served in this capacity since 1989 and also as Executive Vice President of 
the Aspen Institute.  Prior to joining the Aspen Institute, Mr. Firestone 
was a communications attorney and law professor who has argued cases 
before the United States Supreme Court.  He is a former director of the 
UCLA Communications Law Program, first president of the Los Angeles 
Board of Telecommunications Commissioners, and an appellate attor-
ney for the U.S. Federal Communications Commission.
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